A friend sent me a note a few weeks ago alerting me
to the appearance of a new biography of Denis Diderot, the eighteenth century
French thinker who, among other things, edited the multi-volume Encyclopedia that's considered one of
the cornerstones of the Enlightenment. Diderot also wrote pioneering works in
both art criticism and dramatic theory, and his brief dialogue, Rameau's Nephew, is now taken to be a
high-water mark in French literature, though Diderot was reluctant to publish
it.
I haven't thought
much about Diderot in recent decades, but I secured a review copy of the
biography, Diderot and the Art of Thinking Freely, by Andrew Curran, from the editor of Rain Taxi; I enjoyed reading it, wrote a brief
review, and went on to read much lengthier reviews of the book in both the New Yorker and the New York Review of Books. While preparing my little piece, I also
checked P.N. Furbanks biography of Diderot (1992) out of the library and gave it an
extended look, and wrestled my copy of A.M. Wilson's massive biography (1972)
up the stairs from the basement "stacks," though I can't claim to
have looked at it much.
In the course of absorbing all this material I was reminded
of how much I used to admire the way Diderot integrated serious
ideas into a stylistically elevated yet entirely casual narrative. I have
always considered the opening paragraph of Rameau's
Nephew as a matchless example of those qualities—something you would never
come across in the works of Hume or Rousseau.
"Rain or shine, it is my custom towards five o'clock in
the afternoon to walk in the Palais-Royal. There I may be observed, always
alone, musing on the bench by the Hotel
d'Argenson. I am my own interlocutor, and discuss politics, love, taste, and
philosophy. I give my mind full swing: I let it follow the first notion that
presents itself, be it wise or foolish, even as our wild young rakes in Foy's
Alley pursue some courtesan of unchastened mien and welcoming face, of
answering eye and tilted nose, and then quit her for another, touching all and
cleaving to none. My thoughts are my wantons."
Diderot goes on to describe the various chess-players he
watches if the weather is inclement.
"Paris is the corner of the world, and the rue de la Regence
the corner of Paris where the best chess is played: here, at Rey's, the
profound Legal, the subtle Philidor, the solid Mayot do battle with each other;
here may one witness the most astonishing strokes, and hear the most foolish
conversation, for if, like Legal, one may be a man of parts and a great
chess-player, one may equally be a great chess-player and an ass ..."
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Rameau's Nephew? |
The reader's reaction to all of this might be a hearty
"Who cares?" On the other hand, it's refreshing, I think, to conjure,
along with Diderot, such moments of idleness, pleasure, and anticipation, without
making a big deal about it. Who can say what stray and brilliant thought might
roll into view?
As it happens, on one of these occasions Diderot meets up
with a man he describes as "one of the oddest personages this country affords,
where God has not been sparing of them. He is a fellow made up of insolence and
cringing, of folly and good sense: notions of good and bad conduct must needs
be strangely mixed up in his head ..."
At this point Diderot's reverie becomes a dialogue, during
which he discusses a wide range of ethical and aesthetic issues with someone
who shares virtually none of his bourgeois sentiments. It's an interesting
conversation, to say the least, with none of the tendentious interrogations that sometimes mar Plato's
dialogues. It would be a mistake to imagine that Diderot
"wins" the debate, but equally wrongheaded to suggest, as Curran
does, that in Rameau's Nephew Diderot
is somehow repudiating the power of reason itself. Diderot's belief that, as
Curran puts it, humans "are inescapably drawn to the beauty of doing
good," is well founded. But since the eighteenth century, it's never been
fashionable to say so.
There is little point in examining
Rameau's Nephew in detail here, or Diderot's more speculative and scientifically
oriented companion dialogue,
D'Alembert's
Dream. What struck me on reconsidering them in the context of his biography
was the discretion with which Diderot chose to limit his philosophical oeuvre
to two unforgettable gems of artistry and thought, unlike, for example,
Kierkegaard or Nietzsche, who chose to rehash a limited set of ideas again and
again. And again.
A second issue that arose as I read the recent reviews of
the new bio involves the concept of enlightenment itself. We are in the habit
of imagining that enlightenment is a good thing. Would you rather "be in
the dark" about things, or would you rather be enlightened?
On the other hand, as Adam Gopnik observes at some length in
his
review of the new biography, the Enlightenment, as an intellectual
movement, has come in for a good deal of criticism in the last hundred years.
He writes:
"The Enlightenment’s supposed faith in reason ... is
held responsible for racism, colonialism, and most of the other really bad
isms. Enlightenment order is now understood as overlord violence pursued
through other means. Its true symbol is not some peaceful Temple of Reason but
the Panopticon—the all-surveying, single-eye system of Jeremy Bentham’s ideal
prison. Where pre-Enlightenment Europe was sporadically cruel,
post-Enlightenment Europe was systematically inhumane; where the
pre-Enlightenment was haphazardly prejudiced, the Enlightenment was
systematically racist, creating a “scientific” hierarchy of humanity that
justified imperialism. “Reason” became another name for bourgeois oppression,
the triumph of science merely an excuse for more orderly forms of social
subjugation."
This is a more-than-decent synopsis—Gopnik is good at such
things—of an argument that has been fashionable for half a century, but also historically
jejune. Gopnik doesn't buy it, and neither do I. Racism, colonialism, and authoritarianism predate the Enlightenment by centuries, if not millennia.
|
An illustration about bee-keeping
from the Encyclopedia. |
Meanwhile, the basic principles of the Enlightenment are as sound today as they
were when Diderot and others advanced them in the eighteenth century. Chief
among them are the notions that experience is a better source of truth that
divine revelation; that every individual ought to be subject to the same laws,
privileges, and civil procedures; that some sort of reflexivity ought to hold
between those in power and the people over which they rule.
The arguments
offered against the Enlightenment
follow a logic amounting to something like this: the Germans transported Jews
to the gas chambers by rail, therefore, civilization was better off before the
steam engine was invented.
Among the many things that the Enlightenment has produced
are ecology, habeas corpus, feminism, penicillin, social security, national
parks, public libraries, cell phones, and Wikipedia. Books still need editors, and parks still need rangers. But that doesn't make the Enlightenment evil.
In his biography of Diderot F.R. Furbank raises the issue of
whether we ought to speak of "The Enlightenment" or simply of enlightenment with regard to the era.
It's a matter of getting to know things better—what they are, how they work,
what they portend. I suspect that Diderot would agree. Though his biographers
invariably describe him as an atheist and a materialist, it's clear from his
voluminous writings, including his fresh and inconsequential letters to Sophie
Volland, that he was cultivating an ideal of curiosity, conviviality, and
fellow-feeling to which the concept of spirit
could easily be applied.